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Europe as a Symbolic Resource 




The aim of this paper is to reconstruct the structure of discursive positions pertaining to the relationship 
between Poland and the European Union (EU). Such a problematization draws on the assumption 
that Europe is always understood in relation to the nation state and, in turn, the image of the latter is 
explicitly referred to or can be inferred from the vision of the EU. The analysis of the empirical data has 
revealed three discursive positions which organize the production of meaning and govern the strategies of 
representation. The first position represents the EU as a chance for the further modernization of Poland. 
The second position perceives the EU as the game of interests between sovereign nation states. The task 
of the nation state is to benefit from cooperation within an extra-state structure and to retain maximum 
sovereignty at the same time. The third identifies the EU as “a threat” hostile to the nation state and 
its interests. The chain of equivalence connects the EU with almost all negative social phenomena. The 
discursive analytical assumptions adopted in the paper help to show how the same topics and words 
(chance, threat, interests, nation, state, sovereignty, “Europe of fatherlands”, and modernization) acquire 
different meanings in the context of particular interpretations of other words.
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 1.  Introduction
The relationship between Poland, but also other Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries (Batory 
2002: 526; Grabbe/Hughes 1999: 189), and the European Union (EU) is often differentiated into two 
distinct phases. The first phase, called by Stadtmüller (2007: 6) “the age of innocence”, is characterized by 
a lack of knowledge and real understanding of the European Union as an institutional structure. At that 
time Polish foreign policy was guided by the broad principle of Europeanization perceived as “the return to 
Europe” (Törnquist-Plewa 2002). The second phase emerged with the start of negotiations in 1997, when 
enthusiasm began to cool down and initial consensus was gradually replaced by political tensions. I would 
also distinguish a third phase starting with the accession in May 2004. In this phase Poland switched from 
its status of an object which is acted upon, to a full actor which has to face and react to the challenges 
resulting from EU membership. This has created a completely new situation in which European issues, 
regardless of their salience, necessarily have to become a part of the internal political discourse with 
parties debating the question of EU reforms, future treaties, further development, models of institutional 
structure, enlargement plans, and so on.
Although it is difficult to agree with Laure Neumayer’s opinion that European issues played a crucial role 
in the CEE countries’ politics, she convincingly argues that the pro-European line was a  normative theme, 
in the sense of a general rule that political actors adopted after 1989 in order to avoid stigmatization as 
anti-European forces (Neumayer 2008: 8). This normative theme obviously led to the collusion of political 
parties on the issue of the European Union – a situation highly inconvenient from the perspective of party 
identity. With the lapse of time and growing importance of EU issues, a pragmatic theme, connected 
with instrumentalization of the EU issue, emerged and started to shape the behaviour of political parties. 
Parties had to act according to the political logic of identity and difference. The “Yes, but” rhetoric became 
a clear linguistic sign of the discursive strategies of political parties. On the one hand, it is shaped by the 
necessary allegiance to the EU, on the other hand, by an equally necessary instrumentalization of the EU 
issue employed by the political parties to differentiate between each other. Such logic led to the ambiguity 
of political utterances pertaining to the issue-ambiguity, one has to add, is a source of permanent problems 
political scientists face. 
While Neumayer has used political utterances mainly for illustrative purposes, without pondering the 
argumentative strategies of political actors, my aim is not only to reconstruct and illustrate the structure of 
party positions within the political landscape with appropriate excerpts, but also to analyze how political 
positions towards Europe and the EU, as well as lines of division between them, were built. If a discourse 
is a set of categories, ideas and concepts, which gives meaning to the social and physical objects (Hajer 
2006: 67) and politics is about making a diagnosis of reality and providing justification for such a diagnosis,1 
I am interested in the structure of discursive positions, political agents were able to take in Poland while 
speaking about Europe and the EU. What are their constituting elements (ideas, concepts, categories), the 
connections between these elements and the argumentation strategies aimed at justifying a particular 
articulation of Europe and the EU? In line with those who employ various discourse analytical approaches 
1 A view widely held among discourse analysis working both within the Habermasian tradition and in the critical 
discourse analysis (see Habermas 1999; Van Leeuwen/Wodak 1999). They are both interested in the argumen-
tation which used to justify certain statements.
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in the study of EU constructions, I assume that, in order to establish a certain vision of the EU and Europe, 
it is necessary to scrutinize the articulation of collective identity related to the various dimensions of the 
nation state (Wæever 1998: 113). Therefore, I am also going to analyze how visions of the state carried in 
party discourses were articulated in connection with and in relation to Europe.2 To sum up, it is the aim of 
this study, to reconstruct discursive positions on Europe and, given the inherently relational character of 
discourse, its relationship to the (nation) state.
Overview of the Literature
It would not be too bold a generalization to say that one can distinguish between two different strands of 
literature reflecting on the political party positions and discourses on Europe or, to put it in another way, 
different visions and constructions of Europe conveyed by party discourses. Firstly and not surprisingly, 
there is a large number of studies situated within the field of (comparative) party politics including the 
growing body of literature devoted to the issue of Euroscepticism and Europeanization (Poguntke et al. 
2007; Pennigs 2006). Among many theoretical studies, the ones most often referred to are the papers 
of Kopecky/Mudde (2002), Szczerbiak/Taggart (2000) and Ladrech (2002). The most general framework 
to tackle the issue of Europeanization of political parties was developed by Ladrech holding that both 
qualitative and quantitative methods are appropriate to measure changes in the party programmatic 
statements, and that references to the EU in the party manifestos are of crucial significance for this task.
The other articles referred to above, discuss the issue of party positions towards the EU with particular 
focus on different types of Euroscepticism. The differentiation between soft and hard Euroscepticism 
proposed by Szczerbiak and Taggart (2000) and its subsequent critique developed by Kopecky and Mudde 
(2002) led to a fourfold typology of attitudes towards the European Union: Euroenthusiasts, Eurosceptics, 
Europragmatists and Eurorejects. These categories were invented to serve as an ideal type and point of 
reference necessary to qualify the position of a given party. As it immediately turned out, this framework 
also proved problematic, leading to some mistakes and posing obstacles for those who have tried to 
apply it to their own empirical work (Szczerbiak 2008a: 225f). It is commonly claimed that the proposed 
taxonomies are too simplistic and lack cues on how to operationalize the proposed categories of analysis 
(Enyedi/Lewis 2008: 239; Batory 2002: 535). Hence, they tend towards impressionistic, relatively shallow 
and imprecise analyses of programmatic statements (“ideologies”), unable to make sense of the attitudes 
of political actors. From the discursive perspective adopted here, one could say that the main problem of 
these taxonomies lies in the commonly shared positivistic assumptions which treat ideological language 
and discourse as a reflection of reality and make a strong division between discourse and reality. The 
authors, instead of searching for underlying convictions about reality held by political actors so as to be 
able to establish patterns of thinking on the EU, look for the attitudes of political parties towards the EU 
and Europe expressed through ideologies and try to squeeze them into general categories (e.g. Szczerbiak 
2 I am interested in various dimensions of the state’s existence (character of the community, classical attributes 
of the state – sovereignty and interests, economy or culture) not only nation and state structure. Therefore I 
am closer to Diez’ (2001: 13) than Wævers (1998: 113) conception. Whereas the former suggests that in order 
to establish different conceptualizations of Europe it is necessary to take into account a least political, econo-
mic and cultural metanarratives. Related to self-identity, the latter deems significant only the idea of nation and 
state.
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2008a). The problem is that party ideologies are quite complex constellations of signifying elements aimed 
at defining reality and justifying this definition, constantly changing according to different contexts in which 
they appear. Furthermore, there is nothing like the EU or Europe per se but rather a variety of political or 
scientific discourses on Europe. If one adds additional factors to the already mentioned problems such as 
ambiguity of political statements, internal divisions, lack of explicit statement on certain issues and the 
constant changes of party positions; the problems this perspective has to cope with become clear. 
These problems are successfully avoided by those working at the intersection of EU studies and discourse 
analysis. I am thinking especially about two fields within this approach: multi–level governance and studies 
on foreign policy as the outcome of the constellations of state, nation and Europe (Wæver 2005a: 203f). 
The first approach refers to the study of discursive change, employing a precisely designed set of categories 
necessary to code discourse categories, analyzing historically and culturally specific configurations of 
certain categories or meta-narratives and applying concepts strongly rooted within post-structural 
currents of discourse approaches (Jachtenfuchs/Diez/Jung 1998; Diez 2001; Laclau/Mouffe 2007).3 The 
second emphasizes the relationship between discourse and foreign policy and points at the multilayered 
character of discourse with the tiers of discursive structures made of a certain number of core concepts. 
It is argued here that a particular constellation of the concepts nation, state and Europe (Wæver 2005b) 
as well as the idea of international relations (Larsen 1997) is responsible for a certain vision of Europe 
which, in turn, shapes the trajectory of foreign policy related to the EU. Both schools share a number of 
premises and claims which are very close to the view adopted in this paper. First, they suspend the strict 
division between ideology and interest, which is important for comparative party politics, but misleading 
when it comes to the explanation of the behaviour of political actors. It by no means entails any kind 
of naive idealism but rather the strong conviction that interests are an inherent part of the worldview 
of actors, in other words, they are discursively constructed. Second, they underline the importance of 
domestic struggles between political parties, and thus, it are party programmatic statements which 
constitute the main source of these studies. Thirdly, as the reality is discursively constructed and politics 
is the domain where discourses compete, one cannot speak of one, but rather many different “Europes”. 
It is not possible to find the paradigmatic Europe serving as a kind of the Sèvres metre, because we are 
always already speaking from discursive positions. Fourth, research efforts are aimed at establishing the 
relationship, configuration and hence the meaning of elementary components, ideas and concepts which 
constitute discourses. The problem with these approaches is that, despite the significance they ascribe to 
the discursive level, they provide relatively general analysis of discourse. However, if one wants to grasp 
nuances of party position it is necessary to include even the smallest elements, like the recurrent use of 
certain metaphors, key words or topics and the function they play in the text.
Theoretical	Assumptions,	Methodology,	Research	Questions	and	Data
The theoretical and methodological perspective adopted here draws upon the discourse theories of 
Foucault (2002), Laclau/Mouffe (2007), the critical discourse analysis of Fairclough (2003) and the discourse-
historical approach of Wodak (2000). Despite their mutual distance, both perspectives can be treated as 
3 For example “nodal points” (Laclau/Mouffe 2007: 120).
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complementary to each other and equip the research project with a set of ontological and epistemological 
assumptions concerning reality (discourse theory) and a “tool–box” necessary to analyze linguistic 
realizations of meaning (critical discourse analysis [CDA] or Wodak’s discourse–historical approach). First, 
discourse theory assumes that all objects and actions are meaningful and that their meaning is conferred 
by historically specific systems of rules. It tries to understand how particular structures of meaning make 
certain forms of conduct possible. Secondly, what is important for this perspective is the constitutive 
character of language which is not a neutral, passive, and transparent medium expressing pre-given 
identities and objects. It is rather a social practice which, ascribing meaning to certain entities, constitutes 
social identities, relationships between them as well as systems of knowledge and beliefs (Fairclough 2003: 
36; Philips/Hardy 2002: 4). Thirdly, one of the important features of discourse is its unstable character. 
Meanings cannot be definitely fixed and, due to specific shapes of articulation processes, the same signifier 
can have another meaning in the counter-discourse (Howarth/Stavrakakis 2000: 7). Fifthly, concerning the 
question of power, it is linked to the processes of exclusion and “othering” necessary to institute identity. 
Within this perspective, power is tantamount to the exclusion of certain possibilities. It may also mean, 
more generally, the ability to decide on the structure of social world through the imposition of the vision 
of lines and frontiers along which processes of inclusion and exclusion operate. Thus it is necessary to 
analyze the construction of “the other” as the mirror image of the identity of the self.
Translating the above-mentioned premises into the language of the party political field which is studied 
here, one can say that political parties are important actors which struggle to achieve hegemony through 
the ability to impose a particular construction of reality. Effectiveness in the promotion of a particular vision 
of reality is of crucial importance. Only the ability to set apart from other parties justifies and legitimizes 
the very existence of a party. It is also important since parties struggle not only to discursively position 
themselves but also to position others. Politics is mostly about deliberately drawing lines of division in a 
way most convenient for the political party (Hajer 1995: 53). All this means that party discourses create 
various kinds of subjects and simultaneously position these subjects vis-à-vis one another. This is done 
by naming, attributing certain features and justifying this particular choice to achieve legitimacy (van 
Leeuwen 2007: 91f). 
Given this relational character of discourse, it is not surprising that the specific vision of Poland is always 
intimately connected with the vision of Europe. First, given the relational character of discourse, when 
Polish political parties argue about Europe, they necessarily argue about Poland. The specific vision of 
Poland as a sovereign nation state, logically and politically entails a particular concept of the EU architecture 
(for another example see Hansen 2002: 2). Secondly, this specific vision of Poland is the outcome of the 
institutional structure of the EU. As the EU affects its member states, it is no longer possible to speak about 
them alone without any references to Europe. Thirdly, the vision of Poland is connected with the context 
of the political discourse as such. The EU is important for Polish politicians since it is the civilizational and 
geographical point of reference, it is a project Poland participates in, it is an important focus of Polish 
foreign policy and, last but not least, it is an enabling and constraining structure. Therefore, an analysis 
of the landscape of discursive positions on Europe has to take Poland into account. Fourthly, given the 
pluralistic space of democratic politics, and hence the many positions the actors may take, there is not 
one but many “Europes” and, respectively, nation states. Therefore, fifthly, ideas, concepts and categories 
related to “Europe” are not fixed in any final sense, but take on different meanings depending on the 
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various discursive positions taken by the political parties and groupings. Sixthly, the aim of political actors 
is threefold: to provide a definition of reality, to justify it, and to do that in a way which facilitates the 
credible construction of positive self-presentation and negative presentation of “the other”.
I am interested in the structure of discursive space related to Europe, defined as positions and relations 
between political parties. I do not cover the whole discursive structure but only the discourse of relevant 
political parties between 2004 and 2007. There are three general questions which can be further broken 
down into more detailed questions: What positions could be taken by political actors arguing about 
Europe? How is the relationship between Poland and Europe within a given position articulated? How and 
along what lines of division are these positions differentiated from each other? 
In order to answer these questions the empirical data has been chosen. The research was pursued 
on the basis of three types of data: party manifestos4 (and, as a supplement, selected statements and 
resolutions), short hand notes of parliamentary debates on government information on Polish foreign 
policy presented by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs,5 as well as policy statements of the consecutive prime 
ministers.6 Manifestos are definitive statements of party positions. Although these manifestos are rarely 
published by the media, discussed by the party’s rank and file, or considered seriously by party opponents, 
they provide an image of the state of mind of party leaders. They also provide the most general framework 
on which parties build their public image and identity, construct campaign issues, and refer to in their 
justification strategies pertaining to certain decisions or public statements. A manifesto may also be 
an instrument through which parties are made accountable for not keeping their electoral promises. 
Although the manifesto may not attract too much attention, a lack of manifestos is taken by the political 
opponents as an evidence of inability to govern. Yet manifestos are often short, extremely general, evasive, 
vague, and selective. This might be a very interesting research task, but from the qualitative, discourse-
analytical perspective aimed at the reconstruction of discursive complexities, elaborate statements are 
more interesting. This is especially the case in such type of research which is not interested so much in 
quantifying discourse. What counts here is not the number of such statements uttered publicly, but their 
presence in the public sphere as such. Therefore it was a deliberate decision to choose more elaborated but 
still relatively conventionalized types of discourse as a supplement to party manifestos. Prime and foreign 
ministers’ statements and reactions of parliamentarians to their speeches can be perceived as sequences 
of speech acts when sides represent position of their parties. Ministers speaking as party representatives, 
present what they did, are going to do and what is their position towards certain problems, while the rest 
of parliamentarians react to the speech and present their positions. 
Methodologically the research was inspired by the framework developed by Wodak and collaborators 
to study discursive strategies through which political realities and identities are constructed. I found it 
particularly appropriate to study strategies of politicians whose discursive activities can be analytically 
4 The manifestos of six parties were taken into account: Civic	Platform, Democratic	Left	Alliance, Law	and	Justice, 
League of Polish Families, Polish	Peasants	Party and	Self-Defense.
5 Debate on the speeches of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Adam Rotfeld, held on 21 January 2005; the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, Stefan Meller, held on 15 February 2006; and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Anna Fotyga, 
held on 11 May 2007.
6 Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz (10 Novermber 2005), Jaroslaw Kaczynski (19 July 2006), Donald Tusk (23 November 
2007).
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broken into three dimensions: definition of the situation, justification, and the construction of identity 
and difference. The matrix proposed by Reisigl/Wodak (2001) consists of five analytical categories 
which overlap with the aforementioned three parts: (1) nomination – construction of actors by naming; 
(2) predication – attribution of properties, traits; (3) argumentation through which actors legitimize or 
delegitimize certain statements or actions; (4) perspectivation pertaining to points of view from which 
actors construct discourse; (5) intensifying or mitigation strategies necessary to change epistemic status 
(Reisigl/Wodak 2001: 44f; Reisigl 2008: 99). 
For the sake of this study, I am using three categories of analysis which, on the basis of the literature on the 
subject and the initial familiarity with the empirical data, are broken down into detailed categories which 
organize reading and analysis of empirical data (Table 1). As it has been mentioned above, in the national 
political discourse on Europe, the question of Europe is always directly and inextricably linked to the 
national discourse per se and in order to understand the representation of Europe and its functions one 
always has to take national discourse into consideration. I analyzed how both entities were constructed 
vis-à-vis each other, what the dimensions, elements and traits ascribed to both entities were, how such 
representation was justified and how it was positioned against other positions in discourse. 
Table	1:	Analytical	Categories
Table 2 Analytical categories
Type of entity 
(nomination)
Dimensions of discursive construction (predication 
and argumentation)
Lines of division 
(perspectivation)
Poland
Question of membership  –
Vision of the role as a member (active participant vs.  –
passive beneciary)
Vision of a state –
Reason of state/sovereigntyt
Question of sovereign (type of community: society/t
nation, its attributes)
Denition of the situation (problems/resources)t
Position vis-á-vis EU/Europe(central vs. peripheral)t
Positioning and counter- –
positioning (“us” and “them” 
constructs)
Lines of division on the basis of: –







Status generally (identity, federation, confederation,  –
Europe of nations etc.)




Decision-making procedures (reforms, voting  –
mechanisms, institutional structure) and policy elds
Relations between member states –
Consensual/conictualt
Basis of relationship (identity/ideology, interests)t
Old and new member statest
Distribution of resources between statest
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2.  Setting the Polish Context
Before analyzing discursive space as constructed by party manifestos, it is necessary to provide general 
information on relevant actors,7 their ideological profile, genesis, and their position within a party system 
measured by a share of votes they obtained in the consecutive elections held in 2004 (European parliament 
elections), 2005 (presidential and parliamentary elections), and 2007 (early parliamentary elections). 
Among crucial party actors in the period under scrutiny are: Law and Justice,8 Civic Platform,9 Democratic 
Left Alliance,10 Self-Defence,11 League of Polish Families,12 and Polish Peasant Party.13 
 As it has already been said, the growing awareness of the costs connected with EU accession and negotiation 
talks strengthened critical voices which used the EU question as a kind of opportunity structure for their 
domestic popularity. All problems, divisions and differences of opinions between Poland and the EU could 
be and were easily translated into the language of national interests, which made the situation convenient 
for those parties which were eager to act under the guise of the real defenders of national interests. In 
fact, it shaped a new context to practically all groupings, regardless of their former attitude towards the 
EU. A particularly salient example here is the slogan “Nice or death” coined in 2003 by Jan Rokita, one 
of the then leaders of a strongly pro-European party – the Civic Platform. Highly critical voices were also 
possible due to the fact that the deal between Poland and the EU was negotiated by the left wing coalition 
7 Relevant political actors are, according to the Sartori criterion, those actors who were able to secure parliamen-
tary seats (Sartori 1976). Only those parties and grouping which were successful enough to win seats in the 
Sejm (lower chamber of Polish legislature) are taken into account.
8 Law	and	Justice was a right-wing conservative party formed in April 2001. In 2005 the party formed a coalition 
with Self-Defense and League of Polish Families. Jarosław Kaczynski, the party leader took the premiership in 
July 2006. The party lost the 2007 parliamentary election and became the main opposition party. Law	and	Justi-
ce advocates “strong Poland in strong Europe”, to refer to a party’s slogan, what practically meant tough stance 
based on the traditional conception of sovereignty and national interests.
9 Civic	Platform was formed in January 2001 defining itself as a liberal-conservative party. The party remained in 
opposition until 2007 when it won the parliamentary election and formed a coalition government with the Po-
lish	Peasant	Party, with Donald Tusk becoming prime minister. While declaring itself as strongly pro–European, 
party leaders often used a strong language of national interests to defend the voting system guaranteed by the 
Treaty of Nice and “the appropriate” position of Poland in the EU.
10 The	Democratic	Left	Alliance is the successor to the Polish communist party. In 2001, it won the parliamentary 
election and formed a coalition with the smaller Labour Union. Due to corruption scandals, the party then 
suffered a massive decline in support in the 2005 and 2007 parliamentary election. It presents itself as strongly 
pro-European. It was during the left wing government when Poland entered the EU.
11 Self-Defense	represents a paradigmatic case of the populist’s party. It was set up in the early 1990s as both a 
political party and farmers’ union by Andrzej Lepper. Self-Defense emerged as the third largest party in the 2001 
parliamentary election. After 2005 elections Self-Defense	became a coalition partner with its leader as a deputy 
premier. It failed to cross the 5 per cent - threshold for parliamentary representation in 2007.
12 The League of Polish Families was formed in the run up to the 2001 parliamentary election as a coalition of va-
rious small right-wing and clerical-nationalist parties. Its relatively good score in 2005 parliamentary elections 
resulted in the status of the coalition party.  It rejected the EU and claims the renegotiation of the Accession 
Treaty.
13 The Peasant	Party was formed in 1990 as the organizational successor to the former communist satellite United	
Peasant	Party. The party’s share of the vote had been in steadily decline since 1993. Nevertheless it was able 
to cross the 5 per cent - threshold to secure parliamentary representation in 2005. After 2007 elections it was 
in coalition with Civic	Platform. Its position towards the EU oscillates between modest approval and distance 
connected with slogans of national interests.
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formed by the Democratic Left Alliance and the Polish Peasants Party (Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej – 
SLD and Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe – PSL) which held power since the 2001 parliamentary elections. 
Three additional factors made the atmosphere tense on the eve of European parliamentary election 
particularly. First, the post-communist heritage of the ruling coalition made it easy to attribute disrespect 
for Polish interest to the people who before 1989 had been involved in the communist regime. Secondly, 
at that time corruption scandals connected with incumbent politicians were given a high profile, thus 
contributing to the rapid decline in public support for the government. Third, although not particularly 
salient, the issue of the European Constitutional Treaty gained much importance in the political debate. 
Its draft triggered arguments over the proposals to change the voting system in the Council of Ministers 
in a way that appeared to reduce Poland’s influence secured by the Treaty of Nice. Obviously all political 
parties had to react and take a position and their reaction was predominantly negative. The general 
critique of all the opposition parties focused on two points: the lack of references to Christian values 
in the preamble and the changed balance of power between states connected with the proposed new 
voting system which, as was assumed, diminished Polish influences. Not surprisingly, in the June 2004 
elections of the European Parliament (EP), the most Eurosceptic parties obtained 27 per cent of the vote 
(the nationalist Catholic League of Polish Families gained 16 per cent, the populist Self Defence of the 
Polish Republic 11 per cent of the votes). The governing Democratic Left Alliance (election coalition with 
Workers Union), which brought Poland into the European Union, gained less than 10 per cent of the 
votes in the EP election. The next parliamentary elections in 2005 resulted in the marginal victory of Law 
and Justice over Civic Platform. Despite previous declarations of both sides concerning future common 
government, parliamentary cooperation between 2001 and 2005, and common views on many policy 
issues, the harsh and bitter rhetoric of the electoral campaign, the victory of the Law and Justice candidate 
Lech Kaczynski in presidential elections, and conflicting power claims by both parties contributed to a 
climate of mistrust and subsequently led to the failure of the coalition talks. As a result, Law and Justice 
decided to sign “a stabilization pact” and then make a coalition deal with radical critics of the European 
Union: Self-Defence and League of Polish Families in May 2006 (Szczerbiak 2008b). Although entirely 
controversial, it was not the domestic but rather the foreign policy that provoked alarming comments 
from both political opposition within Poland and international actors. Yet in 2006 the leader of Law and 
Justice announced that he “re-claimed” foreign policy from the post-1989 establishment and declared a 
hard line in the Polish foreign policy based on national interests. In a coalition with parties which at best 
wanted renegotiation of Poland’s accession conditions (Self-Defence), and at worst withdrawal from the 
EU (League of Polish Families), the government took unpredictable and inconsistent foreign policy tactics 
which, with their adversarial tone, led to domestic controversies and isolation on the international arena 
(Kaczynski 2008: 15). These controversies did not change the fact that the majority of political forces, 
except left wing parties, opposed the course of institutional reforms of the EU which were taken during 
German presidency. The main objection was connected to the “double majority” system in the drafting of 
the constitution. Both Law and Justice and Civic Platform advocated a so-called “square root system” which 
was finally rejected during the European Summit in June 2007. Due to the confrontational policy style of the 
Kaczynski’s government, European and international issues gained more prominence in the parliamentary 
elections in 2007. The result of the election – the victory of the Civic Platform and the appointment of the 
government in the coalition with Polish Peasant’s Party – cooled down the atmosphere around domestic 
but not necessarily European issues. While the international debate over the EU’s constitutional reforms 
was finished with the signing of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2007, at the domestic level, the debate 
over the appropriate ratification procedure paved the way to further intense political conflicts.
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3.  Europe as a Discursive Resource - Three Positions in the Political Space
As mentioned before, discourse should not be treated as a means of representation which can be freely 
moulded according to the actor’s will and political interests at a given moment. Instead, it is a structure of 
meaning which results from relations between its elements. Discourse enables political subjects to speak 
on Europe but constrains what could be said by limiting the scope of positions which can be taken. These 
constrains may be both diachronic, connected with the history of the discursive field and a given political 
actor, and synchronic, pertaining to the structure of relationships between subjects. 
Fine-grained analysis of the Polish case reveals three discursive positions, which could be taken by political 
parties in the examined period. Instead of treating them topographically, it is better to conceive them as 
the resources that actors can employ in order to build strategies necessary for the achievement of their 
political aims. Among these resources one can point at a number of discursive tools (ideas, concepts, 
categories, lines of argumentation, lexicalization, metaphors etc.) actors can use in their struggle for 
hegemonic vision and division of reality (Bourdieu 1990: 137). What is going to be presented in the 
following subsections are the most typical and coherent positions built around certain concepts which, 
as it is claimed here, are crucial to understand the way in which parties promoted particular visions of 
Europe. They are connected with the evaluation of the European Union rather than with its concrete 
shape, its institutional structure or relations between this structure and member states. Although they 
are not mutually exclusive, they come from different logics and pertain to different dimensions of reality 
and logics of abstractions; they are the perfect entry point into the structure of meaning. The first position 
is best depicted by the constantly repeated slogan of chance which must be used, the second one by the 
category of interests (both Polish and European), and the third one by the idea of Europe as a threat. In 
the context of concrete events (for example debate over the Constitutional Treaty) these positions serve 
as a set of building elements which can be (re)combined in various configurations rather than used in their 
most typical, coherent form. That is why analysts of Polish politics often write of vagueness, ambiguity or 
constant change of positions, neglecting the fact that certain actors use discursive resources from different 
positions (i.e. lexis, argumentation) while consistently expressing the same stance towards the EU.14
3.1  Europe as a Chance
From this discursive position, the European Union is perceived as a structure that has been looked at for 
a long time. The EU accession is unanimously and unambiguously represented as a positive event which 
constitutes a major cause of all positive changes Poland has experienced since 2004. The EU membership 
is a fulfilment of all strategic aims of Polish politics after 1989. Even more, Polish participation in the EU 
structures is inscribed in the long duration of Polish history: “Changed geopolitical position of Poland, 
especially the participation in NATO and the EU, have provided the best opportunities since a few hundred 
years. They are the essence of the Polish raison d’être” (Polska Obywatelska 2007: 22). Usually the period 
referred to, is shorter, pertaining to the post-war division of the continent into two parts. EU accession 
14 The slogan „Nice or death”, uttered by Jan Maria Rokita, one of the then Civic	Platform leaders, in 2003 in the 
parliamentary debate on the Constitutional Treaty, provides a particularly good example of such a mecha-
nism. While it was expressed in an anti-European language of exclusively conceived national interest, this was 
expressed by one of the most pro-European parties and justified in such a way.
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is not just a success for Polish foreign policy. It is a symbol of the end of an unjust separation from the 
Western world (Program Europejski Platformy Obywatelskiej 2005: 35), which was dreamed of by many 
generations of Poles (Manifest Europejski Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej 2005: 71). It is also connected 
with Solidarity as an oppositional anti-communist movement and its efforts to bring about “the dignified 
and sovereign existence of the nation” already in the 1980s (Program Europejski Platformy Obywatelskiej 
2005: 35). Hence the EU is represented not only as a part of the post–1989 politics but also as the object 
of everlasting longing for restitution of normality. The historical perspective employed by politicians is not 
based on retrospective analysis of the past. It rather means to establish a chain of historical moments with 
a “European” event among them. This discursive mechanism helps to represent accession as a unique and 
extraordinary moment and as a context in and through which every decision, political step, institutional 
reform or meeting connected with the EU can obtain positive connotation. In other words, the EU is a 
legitimizing factor. Declarations of pro-Europeanness and of bringing Poland into the EU are elements of 
positive self-presentation. Europe and the European Union are equated with normality, civilization, high 
standards, sometimes explicitly stated, sometimes alluded to, most often assumed. As one of the first 
sentences of the post-communist Democratic Left Alliance’s manifesto states: “We have kept our word 
by bringing Poland into the European Union on the best possible conditions” (Manifest Wyborczy Sojuszu 
Lewicy Demokratycznej 2006: 147, translation by author). Such a formula, although in this particular case 
adopted also to shake off the burden of the communist past and strengthen the social – democratic 
credentials (Tworzecki 2003), is a way to put a party in the glorifying context. “I want to say that Civic 
Platform is the pro-European party and that is why we follow with attention all the remarks of the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs concerning relations with our Western neighbour” (Jan Rzymelka in a parliamentary 
debate on government information on Polish foreign policy 2006, translation by author). References to 
Europe, expressions of support for the EU or declarations of being in favour of European integration are 
often articulated through hyperbole. Whereas it makes the grouping that uses rhetorical exaggeration 
vulnerable to accusations of unrealistic enthusiasm, it also provides legitimizing arguments by linking it to 
the positive connotations of the words “Europe” or “the European Union” and its derivatives.
The positive or even enthusiastic evaluation of membership leads to the question of the conception of 
Polish membership. One does not need to read carefully to locate relevant references. The appropriate 
position of Poland as a member is envisioned as something that does not yet exist. It is rather a task to 
be achieved than an already existing reality. It is a chance to do something, an opportunity which can be 
used, but also wasted. The obligation modality which expresses the position of the speaker and refers to 
the future (Richardson 2007: 60) is articulated here in more or less categorical expressions. As one of the 
party manifestos declares: “Poland should […] through its activity in the process of European integration 
become one of the European leaders” (Polska Obywatelska 2007: 2). Another party used a much more 
resolute tone:  “We have to adapt our national structures to all opportunities created by EU [...] but we also 
have to elbow our way in the EU, to reach a place where political decisions are being made and take a part 
in the decision-making process” (Marek Borowski in a parliamentary debate on government information 
on Polish foreign policy 2005, translation by author). Membership is depicted through three aspects: level 
of involvement, speed and position to be achieved. As to the first, it is often stated that it should be an 
active one, with Poland having precise ideas and a vision of the future Europe. Poland must be involved 
in all important political decisions and should be an active promoter of all steps necessary to make the 
EU more efficient and influential in the world. Ideally, Poland should be ahead of all European countries, 
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playing the role of an agenda setter, initiating certain issues and raising problems. That would give Poland 
a dominant position in problem-definition and issue construction and provide Poland with the most 
convenient solutions. As to the second, Poland should act fast both in its adoption of the EU requirements 
and absorption of financial means. The relationship between Poland and Europe is a dynamic one and 
expressed through a metaphor of movement or race. Poland should move very fast, because chances 
or “Europe as a chance” can “escape” leaving Poland in a “marginalized”, “backward” position (Jolanta 
Szymanek-Deresz in a parliamentary debate on government information on Polish foreign policy 2007, 
translation by author). Thirdly, all above-mentioned claims are functionally connected with the future 
position of Poland. It should finally be able to function as one of the leaders of the EU countries. Poland 
is represented as having agency. Its role is not that of an object, but rather of a subject whose position 
depends on its own potential, ability and eagerness to contribute to the EU. The position of Poland does 
not come automatically from its existence, experience or resources, but requires efforts, especially in the 
field of relations with international partners. Only the active cooperation with them can provide Poland the 
recognition it deserves. Despite declared leadership aspirations, political discourse also employs the well-
known historical frame of progress and backwardness (Jedlicki 2002: 14) where progress is equated with 
fast integration and backwardness with the present situation. Backwardness is either presupposed (what 
happens more often in party manifestos generally avoiding negative tones, see e.g. Manifest Wyborczy 
Sojuszu Lewicy Demokratycznej 2006: 146.) or explicitly articulated (in more spontaneous parliamentary 
speeches, see e.g. Zbigniew Chlebowski in the debate on policy statement of Donald Tusk 2005). Europe 
as a chance is contrasted with the threat of being isolated, marginalized and backward. A marginalized 
position means not only worse conditions but a situation which leads to the imitation of patterns invented 
elsewhere. Interestingly enough, it is not the integration per se, but rather the lack of integration which 
leads to the imitative modernization. Thus, the most dangerous for Poland is the attitude of a reluctant 
partner, stubbornly adhering to specific solutions and unwilling to take into consideration the interests 
of the other partners. The image of threat is used to legitimize political projects and decisions, or is part 
of delegitimizing of political adversaries (Polska Obywatelska 2007: 2; Manifest Wyborczy Sojuszu Lewicy 
Demokratycznej 2006: 154). 
Strong aspirations to a leadership position in Europe are justified by the potential of Poland. The 
discrepancy between Poland and the EU is mainly limited to the economic sphere. The East-West division 
and the better position of Western countries is not constructed as a cultural gap, it is neither a question of 
different religions, nor of problems with trust or cultural capital. The potential differences are by no means 
of cultural or political origins, but rooted in economic deficiencies. In this respect, Poland is represented 
in quite negative terms as a poor and backward country. On the basis of the empirical data analyzed 
here, it is not possible to establish the causes of such backwardness. The sources of such a situation 
are hidden and externalized. They are hidden by the metaphoric nominalization “the tragic verdicts of 
history” (Program Europejski Platformy Obywatelskiej 2005: 39), when the set of processes with the 
actors involved is transformed into the noun, deleting agent and its activities (Fairclough 2003: 143). They 
are externalized through the references to tragic historical experience which happened to Poland. Thus, 
it is not the Poland or Poles which can, at least partially, be blamed for the state of the economy, but 
rather the external factors, be it enemies, historical forces, structural problems, the communist system 
and so on. Despite the backwardness which is constantly referred to either explicitly or implicitly, Poland 
is represented as a country which deserves and should strive for an appropriate position. Huge difficulties 
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located predominantly in the material conditions, do not prevent the portrayal of the country as big and 
populated enough to become one of the most influential European actors. “The chance appeared for 
Poland, a country with a considerable size and population, to play an inspiring role on the old continent” 
(Jolanta Szymanek-Deresz in a parliamentary debate on government information on Polish foreign policy 
2007). Other factors of Polish strength are also named. “The problem is that, while having this potential 
of a big European country, the whole Polish legend of fight for freedom, big economic market, and 
also industrial and intellectual potential, also the spiritual one, we are not able to make good use of it” 
(Bronisław Komorowski in a parliamentary debate on government information on Polish foreign policy 
2007). Such a construction of Polish problems, resources and position vis-à-vis Europe has twofold aims. 
On the one hand, the danger of becoming a marginalized and backward country can be used to stigmatize 
the opponents of the promoted political vision. On the other hand, the positive vision of Poland as a 
resourceful country, burdened with the heritage of an underserved past becomes a legitimizing argument. 
It strengthens specific political projects by providing a positive context, which can only be brought about 
through the implementation of solutions put forward by discourse users.
Although there are plenty of references to “the people” (Canovan 2008) they are not articulated in nationally 
or ethnically exclusive terms. “The people” are represented as society more often than as a nation. Even 
the nation on this discursive position is represented more in political – legal terms as a group of citizens 
or as community of different groups with equal rights (100 konkretów - Program Lewicy i Demokratów 
2007: 1). Such a construction of national identity precludes the essentialization of identity in a sense of an 
inherent, changeless set of features common to national community. On the contrary, loyalties other than 
the national one are accepted as legitimate identity options. Hence the ideas of “European patriotism” 
or “double citizenship” (both Polish and European) are not only tolerated but warmly welcomed in 
the utterances of politicians. They are not perceived as contradictory aspects of identity, inimical to 
national loyalty, but as another dimension, in which the former one is nested (Bronisław Komorowski 
in a parliamentary debate on government information on Polish foreign policy 2007). Moreover, the 
difference between Poland and Europe or the EU is not exaggerated. On the contrary, even if it exists, it is 
systematically blurred or suspended. Poland is constructed as a part of Europe, not a distant country from 
the peripheries. As Prime Minister Donald Tusk put it in his policy statement: “In our speeches we often, 
including myself, refer to the comparisons to Europe. I would like us to stop differentiate in our language: 
We in Poland, they in the European Union. After all the European Union is here” (Policy statement of 
Donald Tusk 2007, translation of author). 
The possibility of multiple identities and the equation of Poland and the European Union have important 
consequences for the construction of national interest and state sovereignty. These two categories are 
not confronted with the EU. On the contrary, merely the EU can advance and secure the realization of 
interests of a given nation state. Polish interests are constructed as completely compatible with the EU 
and they can be only achieved through the EU. Such a construction, on the one hand, is supplemented 
with a consensual attitude reluctant to exaggerate differences and is sensitive to the common good; on 
the other hand, it expresses the concern that “a tough stance” may be considered by Western partners 
as an inability to negotiate and a stubborn attitude that claims too much (Jolanta Szymanek-Deresz in 
a parliamentary debate on government information on Polish foreign policy 2007). The same is the 
case for sovereignty, which is not treated as a traditional and unitary attribute of the state but rather 
as a phenomenon which can be shared when the state decides that it is in its interests to cede certain 
decisions to extra-state structures. From this discursive position such ideas are non-controversial and 
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taken for granted (Tadeusz Iwiński in a parliamentary debate on the government information on Polish 
foreign policy 2005). Arguments legitimizing Polish accession and membership in the European Union 
resort to a variety of motives: cultural, political and instrumental. Cost-benefit calculus is by no means the 
most important. Europe is a community of values which overlaps with Polish identity. It is a project which 
demands a certain degree of idealism and self-restriction. It provides security not only to Poland but to 
the rest of the world and stabilizes and deepens democratic procedures, still volatile and uncertain in the 
conditions of the post-communist state.
Positive hyperbole of the EU in relation to Poland is connected with an image which does not confine itself 
to the purely institutional structure aimed at advancing interests of particular countries. The main slogan 
which is used in relation to the EU is “chance” – an abstract noun with positive connotation. It is the EU 
membership that is captured extraordinarily often as a chance for Poland. Chance is represented as an 
opportunity, which should be filled by Poland with the concrete content. This chance can be used, but it can 
also be wasted. It is the specific political context and position of the discourse users (either in government 
or in opposition) which determine the concrete meaning of “chance”. Generally speaking, its function can 
be twofold. Firstly, it confers positive meaning on the EU; secondly, it holds forth unfulfilled promise. It 
constitutes a part of prospective statements pertaining to the future which is not yet actualized. While 
helping political actors to claim “more EU” in Poland, hence legitimizing a particular vision of European 
integration, it also allows to explain undesirable aspects of reality as resulting from an insufficient level of 
EU integration. Within such logics it is the lack of the EU and European integration which is responsible for 
the current problems of Poland. The EU is also used interchangeably with Europe as a geographical and 
cultural space. What is more, the EU is referred to as the process of “European integration”. Beyond that, 
collocations and metaphors with the adjective “European” are often used: “family of nations”, “European 
house”,15 “European community”, “European standards”, “European level”, “European civilization”, and 
“European education” (Policy statement of Donald Tusk 2007). “European” is not simply a descriptive term 
here. In connection with other words it acquires a normative meaning. Its function is to make sense of 
the EU as a close, intimate, “warm” community, which goes beyond contractual bonds based on self-
interest. It also serves as a marker of a better world, able to confer a positive meaning on the neighbouring 
words. “We are with you and with you we want to be a part of modern Europe as the world of tolerance, 
freedom and respect to the opinions of the others”. These sentences from the manifesto connect Europe 
with positive attributes: modernity, freedom, tolerance, respect. It is a separate world, different from 
the space outside. It is represented as a space where Poland aspires to belong but is still outside, at least 
in certain respects. Europe as a word loaded with strong, positive values serves here as a legitimizing 
formula, creating community, referring to highly praised values and serving as a point of reference (100 
konkretów - Program Lewicy i Demokratów 2007: 1).
Whereas political actors deny that the EU is a superstate (Policy statement of Donald Tusk 2007), they 
do not provide a detailed image of Europe in their discourse. It is rather represented as a structure in 
statu	 nascendi (Program europejski Platformy Obywatelskiej 2005: 35). One can more easily trace 
statements related to the future of the EU, which obviously help parties to present what they are standing 
for. However, it is also possible to find some statements on the current state of the EU on presupposed 
level. “The European Union should become a community, not only an agreement between states. [...] 
We support strengthening and improving the functioning of EU institutions – European Commission and 
15 For more on this metaphor see: Chilton/Ilyin (1993: 7f).
18 | KFG Working Paper No. 10 | January 2010 
European Parliament” (Program Europejski Platformy Obywatelskiej 2005: 36). Despite the lack of explicit 
statements the text carries the message that communal bonds are too weak and that the EU does not 
operate efficiently enough. One can also find many declarations referring to the necessity of deeper and 
faster integration. On the assumed level they say a lot about perception of the actual state of European 
matters. The majority of such presupposed statements are related to democratic values and social 
dimensions understood mainly in economic terms as reluctance of wealthier EU states to provide financial 
support. The EU as a normative entity which is still to come is envisioned as a deeply integrated federal 
structure based on democracy and civic participation, with a common currency and an active role on the 
international arena through a common foreign policy (Manifest Europejski Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej 
2005: 72f; Polska Obywatelska 2007: 22f). One has to add that this vision of Europe and its legitimization 
was used to promote various decision-making procedures. Left wing groupings promoted solutions of the 
Constitutional Treaty, whereas Civic Platform adhered to the solutions encapsulated in the Treaty of Nice.
Such a construction of Poland, the EU or Europe and their relationship certainly has its “other(s)” present 
as the excluded possibility at the logical level and at the level of discursive practices as the outcome of 
discursive construction. Most generally, “the other” was the opposite angle of “the most pro-European”, 
according to self-definition, parties. The signifier “anti-European” established a chain of equivalence 
between multifarious elements. Hence “the other” was nominated and predicated through proper names 
(right wing, incumbent Prime Minister), attitudes (Euroscepticism, intolerance, confrontational, exclusionary 
attitude, national egoism, obsessions and phobias), properties of mind (short-sighted, narrow-minded, 
old-fashioned, with 19th century vision of sovereignty), activities and their outcomes (taking unnecessary 
tough stance in negotiations, isolating, marginalizing Poland, slowing down integration process). 
3.2		 Europe	as	a	Game	of	Interest	between	Nation	States
The most salient topos of this discursive position is the idea of Poland as a nation state permanently 
looking after its main national interest – independence. This category is used in a very traditional 
way, disregarding the fact of mutual bonds and necessity of cooperation between states in the unified 
Europe. Monistically understood sovereignty, used interchangeably with the category of independence, 
constitutes a basis for the European aspects of party manifestos and a crucial argument in the political 
debates. “The fundamental aim of foreign policy is the defence of the national interest. […] The aims 
of our European politics: […] inviolability of sovereignty of the Republic of Poland in foreign policy” (IV 
Rzeczpospolita – sprawiedliwosc dla wszystkich 2006: 127). The vision of European politics is based on 
the cluster of categories which constitute this strand of discourse. First, the strong attachment to the 
nation state functions as a basic organizing unit of social and international relations. The Polish state 
is the entity most often referred to. It is the basic and most important actor, expressing the interests 
of the community living within its boundaries. As Prime Minister Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz put it in his 
policy statement: “An independent and safe Polish state is a priceless good, worth every effort and every 
sacrifice” (Policy statement of Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz 2005, translation by the author). Secondly, interest 
becomes a crucial category, being represented in a reifying and naturalizing manner. It is perceived as 
inherent, changeless and obvious essence of the nation state. “National interest” is a phrase which seems 
to be of crucial value on this discursive position. “Poland needs a new European politics today […] It is 
necessary to restore thinking guided by the category of national interest” stated in the first sentences of the 
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2005 parliamentary elections manifesto of Law and Justice (Program polityki europejskiej PiS 2005: 120). 
Interests are rarely represented as context-dependent and flexible. They are given and assumed rather 
than explained. Regardless of the frequency with which interests are referred to, it is very difficult to find 
any definition of them. They are rather invoked in relation to specific events and problems. Thirdly, the 
category of independence is represented as a supreme property of the state. It is necessary to note that the 
category of independence is used interchangeably with the category of sovereignty. In the Polish political 
culture the latter is less an analytical term, loaded normatively and burdened with historical meaning 
pertaining to dramatic events of the past. Such a set of assumptions reflects itself in the normative image 
of Europe as a loose network of states. It is aimed at providing a ground for negotiations necessary to find 
the biggest common denominator of divergent interests of nation states. Not surprisingly, this general 
vision of relations between Poland and the EU, strongly rooted in classical realist thought, determines a 
cold attitude towards the latter. In this respect, the following excerpt from the party manifesto is striking: 
“Only coherent politics, coordinated by the government, will help to limit the threats and use the chances 
connected with the participation of Poland in the EU” (Program polityki europejskiej PiS 2005: 120). 
Chances which the EU provides, so often invoked in the first discursive position, occupy here a second 
place, being preceded by “the threats”. Although EU membership is positively evaluated it is treated as a 
dangerous necessity that can affect Polish sovereignty. 
Interestingly enough, such a vision does not preclude the activity of the state. The role of state and its 
elites is not reduced to the reactive defence of status quo against the external forces. Neither is Poland 
envisioned as a passive member which tries to defend its interests. On the contrary, passivity is a feature 
attributed to the political opponents. “The presence of Poland in the European Union should help to 
satisfy Polish interests, not passive participation in its structures” (Program polityki europejskiej PiS 2005: 
120). It is the active politics through which Polish interests can be defended and which help achieve a 
strong position in Europe. This aim is justified both symbolically, as the only status which is appropriate for 
Poland as a big country, and pragmatically, as the position which provides influence necessary to control 
social and political processes in Poland and the EU. Although there are a number of arguments legitimizing 
Polish accession, they have one, already mentioned and permanently invoked point of reference – “national 
interest”. “The fundamental aim of foreign policy is the defence of the national interest” (IV Rzeczpospolita 
– sprawiedliwosc dla wszystkich 2006: 122). Not only this category is constructed through the reference 
to the “we” community created by nation. One can also find such categories as “national life”, “national 
culture”, “national tradition”, and “national honour”. They all construct the vision of the community as a 
national group. The nation is an entity that is rather taken for granted, not a phenomenon which requires 
a more or less precise definition. A contextual analysis provides additional information which helps to 
disambiguate this category. Statements like “traditional social order”, “natural communities” (Program 
polityki europejskiej PiS 2005: 120), and “a thousand-year-old tradition of Polish nation and state” (IV 
Rzeczpospolita – sprawiedliwosc dla wszystkich 2006: 131) suggest that the nation is perceived as 
unchanging, natural and able to limit the space of identification with other communities. Although there 
are no explicit statements which would suggest a strong ethnic understanding of the term, categories like 
“Polish interests”, “Polish culture”, “Christian values” carry suggestions which may be very attractive to the 
more traditional part of the electorate. Ambiguity and implicitness play a double role, helping to attract 
support from more traditional groups, but on the other hand shielding against accusations of nationalism. 
The vision of the sovereign as a natural community based on Christian values is supplemented by a 
metaphor of the state as a structure which must serve the interests of the nation and where the nation 
can feel itself at home. It is the Polish state, not the EU, which is envisioned as a common house (Dbamy o 
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Polske. Dbamy o Polakow. Program PiS 2007: 1) and the principle of independence governs the production 
of discourse pertaining to interests and sovereignty. The vision of the strong, independent state with 
the monistically interpreted sovereignty is based on historical allusions and explicit arguments. The past 
problems Poland had with sovereignty, the loss of independence and attachment to the own state are 
claims which draw their power from the historical parallels. The idea of Poland as an old historic nation 
(Marek Jurek in a parliamentary debate on government information on Polish foreign policy 2005) and 
tragic experiences of the Polish history where Poland’s sovereignty was violated - partitions in the 19th 
century, World War Two, the communist system after 1945 - are put forward as arguments pertaining to 
the theme of Polish sovereignty. They are designed to justify a reluctant attitude towards solutions which 
entail the transfer of sovereignty to other than national bodies. Historical parallels are also an important 
part of the argumentation strategy aimed at validating financial claims. According to this discursive position, 
dramatic past experiences justify financial claims directed to Western neighbours. These claims are not 
only legitimized through historical or moral arguments. The development of Poland and other countries 
of the region would also be beneficial for the whole European Union (Program polityki europejskiej PiS 
2005: 122).
Positive self-presentation is not exhausted by the vision of a Christian nation. There are explicit normative 
statements which underline the greatness of the Polish nation. It is not only the demographic, intellectual, 
organizational and infrastructural potential which is a source of pride, but a national culture, the marker of 
distinctiveness and source of strength. The nation is constructed as a community whose identity is based 
on culture. The latter is not just a collection of norms, values and artifacts of many groups, it is reified “a 
national” resource which provides identity and which was “a space of independence in times of threat” 
(Program polityki europejskiej PiS 2005: 120). The monistic and essentialized conception of culture treats 
it as a set of coherent and unified norms, but also images of the glorified past organized around Catholic 
religion treated as natural worldview of the people. Culture is “a treasure” and as such must be taken care 
of, defended and cannot, by any means, be an object of any intervention from the EU. Therefore the idea 
of cultural sovereignty is put forward (Policy statement of Jaroslaw Kaczynski 2006). Culture is the sphere 
where sovereignty cannot be an object of any compromise. Although on this discursive position a certain 
limitation of national sovereignty is reluctantly accepted, it is not applied to the field of culture, represented 
as a fully independent sphere. Any possible interventions in this sphere are constructed as a danger posed 
to the fabric of society. Such perceptions enable political actors to develop parallels with the historical 
moments or at least allude to the common knowledge of the past problems with independence.
The rule of positive self-presentation also organizes representations of problems and threats. The 
definition of a situation is based on two assumptions which help to legitimize a conception of foreign 
policy and a conception of EU-membership promoted on this discursive position. The first assumption 
claims that the foreign policy of previous governments was passive and submissive. What was depicted on 
the first discursive position as the activity sensitive to the common European good and interests of other 
states unnecessarily becomes a servile attitude of Polish elites. The number of epithets and metaphors is 
employed to depict politicians and their activities. “Lobbistic deals”, “ideology of euroenthusiasm”, “the 
party of white flag” (Program polityki europejskiej PiS 2005: 120), “the politics of a masked ball”, “politics 
on the knees” (Paweł Kowal in the debate over the policy statement of Donald Tusk 2007) are expressions 
used to accuse political opponents of disregarding the Polish raison d’état. All accusations are imbued 
with strongly populist tread and refer to allegedly soft stance of the Polish politicians towards the Western 
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elites. The metaphor of the party or ball, where procedures and interests are left behind being replaced 
by informal connections and cowardly negotiations constitutes a particularly illustrative example of such 
discourse. The conclusion is that Poland should be active and tough in its foreign policy in order to control 
the development of the EU and to avoid a secondary status, inappropriate to sizeable, populated country 
with the central position in Europe and glorious historical experience (“Solidarity” movement, victory over 
communism). Another legitimizing argument claims that activity is necessary in order to avoid imitative 
modernization which would condemn Poland to mechanical adaptation to foreign patterns, regardless of 
local peculiarities and traditions. 
The second assumption justifies Polish membership by frequent references to economic backwardness. 
Economic difficulties are externalized by being entangled with historical argumentation. Although the 
structure of argumentation is very similar to the first discursive position, the salience and explicitness of 
historical arguments is considerably stronger. They are inscribed in the wider problem of the economic 
“chasm” between Western and Eastern parts of the continent with roots in the Yalta agreements in 1945. 
Growing out of the historical contingency, this division is used as an argument justifying financial claims 
directed towards Western European states. The rule of solidarity, constantly used in this context, resorts to 
the duty of Western countries to help their East European neighbours treated unjustly in the past. The EU, 
often equated with Western European countries, should act according to its own rule of solidarity to do 
historical justice and compensate for the past grievances caused by the division of the continent. The need 
and prospects of economic help is the main legitimizing argument in favour of EU membership. Therefore 
the assessment of Polish condition and status in the EU and its activities is based on the costs–benefit 
calculus that to a large extent is informed by the vision of international relations as a zero-sum game. 
The discursive construction of Europe is organized according to a set of the following rules. First, there is 
a strong division between the normative and the descriptive vision of the EU and it is the former which 
provides the evaluating framework for the latter. The normative vision does not refer only to the future, 
it also represents the past. According to the Law and Justice manifesto, the founding fathers of the EU 
thought of Europe as a structure based on Christian values and current reality represents nothing but 
a deviation from this idea. Secondly, the current state of affairs is criticized as deviating both from the 
past intentions of the founding fathers of the EU and from the future ideal. It is seen as a structure in 
the crisis that is caused by the egoism of the strongest EU states (which are never explicitly named). 
Thirdly, the crisis manifests itself through manifold symptoms: “antichristian censorship” which denies 
the “natural” axiological basis of Europe, violation of the solidarity rule through reluctance to fill the 
gap between rich and poor EU countries, reduction of the whole EU integration to economic interests, 
creation of the multispeed Europe, with the exclusive group of states inclined only to satisfy their national 
interests, retention of the strong division between new and old member states in respect of financial 
resources and institutional position (Program polityki europejskiej PiS 2005: 121). Fourthly, it all leads to 
the vision of the EU as a vehicle advancing the interests of the strongest states. Therefore, the EU is seen 
as a threat and such a definition of the situation overlaps with the external/internal frame through which 
the EU is perceived. The EU as external threat is articulated through militaristic expressions (“to defend”, 
“protection”, “degrade”, “battle”) with manifold functions. They not only enhance the vision of the EU as 
a threatening “other”, but also give credence to the historical allusions and build an image of the speaker 
as a relentless fighter for the national interest. Fifthly, the normative vision is based on the idea of shallow 
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integration (even though this word is used extremely seldom), the economic cooperation or platform of 
negotiations rather than a community. The category of “interests” is a predominant one, pushing aside 
such words as “community” or “integration”. There is also no place for the difference between states in 
respect of the level of integration, hence the idea of multispeed Europe is rejected. Multispeed Europe 
would lead to an unequal treatment of states with the strong differences between the biggest and richest 
states and the rest. The basic rule determining the position of the state should be sovereignty which cannot 
be limited to certain spheres (i.e. foreign policy, culture). The EU is represented as a strong association 
between nation states guided by the principle of sovereignty. It is rather a platform for the advancement 
of separate and often contradictory interests, than the engine of integration which would bring benefits 
to all involved countries (Anna Fotyga in a parliamentary debate on government information on Polish 
foreign policy 2007). The EU is valued positively and accepted to the extent it allows for the maximization 
of the economic and geopolitical interests of Poland. It is more like an additional international agent 
whose influence and power are so big, that cooperation and alliance become inevitable. Not surprisingly, 
on this discursive position popular, although not particularly visible in the empirical data analyzed here, 
is the slogan of “Europe of Fatherlands”. Its vagueness and clear reference to the nation state makes it a 
particularly efficient signifier in the political struggle.
Based on such exclusions and differentiations, the discursive “other” is an important part of this position. 
The identity is to a large extent built on the rejection, criticism and exclusion of other positions. Positive 
self-presentation is inherently connected with negative “other” presentation, because a harsh criticism is 
an inseparable part of the whole political project. “The other” appears in two different forms here. The 
first form can be depicted as an internal “other” constituted by political elites, other parties, incumbent 
politicians or previous governments in Poland. Here “the other” is envisioned as ideological, unrealistic, 
passive, submissive, disregarding national interests and cultural heritage, serving external interests, 
promoting a federal vision of Europe (Program polityki europejskiej PiS 2005: 122 f; Dbamy o Polske. 
Dbamy o Polakow. Program PiS 2007: 49). The second form is the external “other” identified with the EU, 
strongest EU countries, and the foreign media. Among the properties attributed to them are the following: 
egoism and self-interest (they do not want to allocate money for the accession, pursue only narrowly 
defined national interests), ideological attitude (liberal or socialist reluctance towards Christian values), 
centralism and hegemonic tendencies (the EU wants to centralize, strongest countries want to dominate 
new EU countries) or weak position in international politics caused by internal divisions between member 
states. Particularly striking in the representation of the external “other” is the general nomination, which 
avoids naming the subjects on which discourse speaks. Actors are referred to as “some” or “certain” (i.e. 
Dbamy o Polske. Dbamy o Polakow. Program PiS 2007: 49), which is obviously the way to avoid international 
reactions, but additionally, it serves other purposes. Firstly, it creates a community of the initiated, those 
who know what is the meaning of vague and general statements. Secondly, it enhances curiosity of those 
who are not able to decipher allusions. Thirdly, it increases the feeling of threat, by assigning negative 
intents and acts to the unknown subjects. 
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3.3  Europe as a Threat
The third discursive position was unambiguous in its rejection of EU accession. Yet before the accession 
referendum it was possible to construct statements which exhorted to vote against the EU. Hence, after 
the Polish accession to the EU, particularly interesting became the question how discourse users have 
restructured strong “rejectionist” positions in order to adapt to the new situation. An additional discursive 
problem was posed by the fact that the most radically Eurosceptic agents built a parliamentary base for 
the government formed after the 2005 elections.
The basis of this discourse is constituted by the set of claims known in the history of social and political 
theory as nationalism in its ethno-symbolic version. First, political and national units should be congruent 
and it is the most natural thing for the nation to have its own state (Gellner 1983: 1). As other nation 
states want to advance their interests, the fundamental task of Poland is to protect its sovereignty and 
independence, the supreme values without which the existence of the nation is no longer possible. 
Although independence is the value shared with the second discursive position, its interpretation takes a 
more radical form. “The state is independent, if it is not subjected to any external entities. The feature of 
the independent state is the primacy of its interests over those interests, which result from the cooperation 
with other states” (Dlaczego nie dla UE? – kontrowersje ideowe 2005: 150). Secondly, the nation is the only 
one sovereign and the state should serve its interests and articulate its alleged will. That does not mean 
absolute voluntarism of the sovereign. Its will is restricted and determined by the natural law, constituted 
in the last instance by God. Thirdly, the essentialism claiming that the identity of a nation is changeless 
is based on common history and national features, which are part of quasi–psychological theories. In 
the Polish case the nation is represented as an eternal monistic entity, bound by Christian values and 
an attachment to freedom which was proved many times in the history. “Traditional moral order of the 
nation” and the “fundamental role of Christianity” are constructed as eternal elements of Polish identity. 
This discursive position represents a typical traditionalist attitude based on the assumption of a sanctifying 
function of the past. That is why the nation’s past with glorious historical moments is invoked more often 
than on the second position. Traditionalism is supplemented with an exclusivist attitude in a sense that 
the possibility of other worldviews or value systems is beyond the intellectual horizon. It is not possible 
to be a member of the Polish nation without a certain connection with Catholicism. Fourthly, the nation is 
represented as an entity strong enough to be fully autonomous, able to exist and develop independently 
of external influences. They are more often defined as obstacles to the natural existence of the national 
organisms, than as a stimulus of the development. Hence, extra state factors are represented as a 
threat, which should be opposed and countered. Sometimes the exaggeration of the external influence 
perceived as threat is pushed so far that it leads to claim the following: “The development of Poland is 
possible only beyond the EU” (Skrót program gospodarczego 2006: 76). Fifthly, the nation and its state 
are glorified entities. They have enough resources and strength to survive in the inimical world of other 
nations. Although its main factor of strength lies in its Christian identity and culture,16 other factors are 
also mentioned. Among them are culture, territory, demography, economic potential (Janusz Dobrosz 
in a parliamentary debate on government information on Polish foreign policy 2007). All attributes and 
features of the nation and its culture are always put forward in the comparison to other entities. What 
is national is immune to any type of criticism, always already constituting the positive extreme of the 
16 For more on the intimate bond between religion and nation in Poland see Zubrzycki (2006).
24 | KFG Working Paper No. 10 | January 2010 
analyzed problem. Thus, by definition, whatever and whoever is bad and deserves critique cannot be part 
of the nation. Such aspects are evaded, marginalized or deemed as non–national or even anti–national, 
contradictory to the real essence of the nation. 
The language which constructs independence and full, undivided sovereignty as the supreme values makes 
sense of the world through the metaphor of conflict. Sometimes conflict can take the form of a struggle, 
sometimes it is envisioned as a manipulation aimed at hiding real intents and interests of the opponent. 
Such a philosophy expresses itself through a militaristic regime depicting the division between the nation 
and its enemies. Drawing boundaries and producing frontiers between the national entity and the extra-
national phenomena are major discursive mechanisms which frame the representations of Poland, the EU 
and their mutual relationship. Consequently, the divisions between us versus them and internal versus 
external become crucial cognitive metaphors. Nationalist assumptions structure the EU related discourse 
along the strong dichotomy between two positions. “First, there is the traditional conception of sovereign 
and independent nation state, hostile to utopian ideas of fraternization of the people in international 
kolkhoz, unambiguously against melting the nations in a non-national pot. Second there is the federal, liberal 
and non-national conception, hostile to the independence of nations, perceiving happiness of humanity 
in creations such as the EU.” (Dwie koncepcje, dwa obozy 2005: 149) Such a rhetorical strategy not only 
cancels any intermediate position and pushes political opponents to the extremes, but also, through strong 
evaluations, attributes to them unwanted, deprecatory and delegitimizing properties. Structuring the 
conflict in polarized terms enables to treat all political opponents as the enemies of Polish independence. 
What is also significant is the historical argumentation with allusions to communism (“kolkhoz”). The 
topos of the EU as a centralized structure, similar to the communist state, is often employed on this 
discursive position, drawing on the predominant cleavage of Polish politics between post-communism and 
anti-communism. The anti-communist language of the communist enemy changeless and permanently 
posing threat to the existence of nation is translated into the anti-European language. Thus the European 
Union becomes a discursive equivalent of the communist system. Such a mechanism, however, is only part 
of the larger argumentation strategy aimed at drawing parallels between various aspects of EU integration 
and dramatic, historical aspects of Polish history as the 19th century partitions, the communist system 
or betrayals in the past (Janusz Dobrosz in a parliamentary debate on government information on Polish 
foreign policy 2006). The mere fact of invoking the historical discourse does not distinguish this position 
from the first and particularly the second one. It is rather the function they play in the overall structure of 
discourse that marks the difference. The history on the third discursive position is constructed according 
to the romantic topos of messianism and insurrectionism. Analogies it provides serve as warnings 
against the EU. The past fights against the enemies and the redeeming properties of defeats constitute a 
historical chain in which the EU as a federalist structure inimical to the Polish independence is inscribed. 
Consequently, the difference between past enemies and the EU is systematically suspended (Dlaczego nie 
dla UE? – kontrowersje ideowe 2005: 151). 
The conception of indivisible sovereignty and the construction of independence as complete autonomy 
of the nation state led to the rejection of membership. Nevertheless, a discourse of this type faces the 
problem of a wide popular support for membership. The question is how to reconcile the glorification of 
the nation with the fundamental critique of its opinions and decisions. A few discursive strategies which 
are employed aim at reducing the level of agency of the nation. First, it is argued that Poles voted for 
“the Europe of Fatherlands”, not an ideological, federal structure. It is the specific vision of a European 
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structure which met with the acceptance of the electorate, but by no means has it entailed the acceptance 
of the European integration as such. “We can discuss economic issues, but I repeat again: the majority 
of Poles voted for the European Union as the Europe of Nations, not a federalized state, not ‘United 
States of Europe’, dominated by one ideology, contradictory to a large extent to the majority of opinions 
of our compatriots.” (Janusz Dobrosz in a parliamentary debate on government information on Polish 
foreign policy 2005, translation of author) Secondly, it is claimed that people simply made a mistake as 
it had happened many times in the past. This explanation dramatizes the EU accession by comparing it 
to past decisions and activities of  society which led to unfavourable consequences, including the loss of 
independence. Third, the Polish nation was betrayed and manipulated by the pro-European propaganda 
(Aby Polska Polska byla… nawet w Unii Europejskiej 2006: 143). The strength of argumentation is enhanced 
by lexicalization. Poland did not just enter the EU, as would be possible to state on other discursive 
positions. Poland was rather „pushed” (Aby Polska Polska byla… nawet w Unii Europejskiej 2006: 143) 
or „brought in” (Jan Łopuszański in a parliamentary debate on government information on Polish foreign 
policy 2005). Such words, through agent deletion (it is not stated who pushed or brought in) not only 
allow to construct accusations according to a specific context and arise suspicion, but also help to avoid 
references to the nation and enable to present the nation state as an object that is acted upon, rather 
than an active subject. 
Declarations of rejection and withdrawal are supplemented by statements announcing strong defence of 
Polish national interests necessary in the hostile conditions Poland ended up with. Its membership should 
be active, but this time, contrary to other positions, the main activity must be oriented at preventing 
further integration by any means. Hence an apparently paradoxical support for further enlargement 
is constructed. It is believed that the bigger the number of member states the bigger and possibly 
insurmountable are the obstacles to deeper integration. Accordingly, only a very modest vision of the EU 
is promoted. It is reduced merely to a mechanism of economic cooperation between states. Sometimes 
the idea of “Europe of fatherlands” is invoked, but it lacks precise qualification necessary to determine the 
exact content. The vagueness of this expression helps retaining euro-rejectionist argumentation and at the 
same time positioning at a safe distance from the mainstream of political competition and public opinion 
which treat the EU as an important point of reference. Being against any kind of Europe would mean self-
marginalization. However, one needs to add, the discursive construction of identity is based on a critique 
rather than a positive definition of the situation. The EU is consistently and unambiguously represented 
as a fundamental threat to all dimensions of the nation state. A “scare strategy”, understood as the use 
of an exaggerated image and extensive attention to the alleged threat (Flowerdew/Li/Tran 2002: 325), 
guides the construction of the EU as actual and future entity. There are two crucial mechanisms on which 
this strategy is based: the de-contextualization and the generalization of the negative aspects of the EU 
so that they can describe the whole structure. The overall critique directed against the EU as a threat to 
sovereignty and independence, is broken into the detailed critiques of different aspects, all of them posing 
great danger to Poland. First, the EU is a superstate, a bureaucratic regime with centralizing tendencies 
aimed at eliminating all nation states. As it was already said, in order to make sense of this phenomenon, 
historical parallels are multiplicated, all of them referring to the totalitarian and authoritarian experiences 
of the past. They do not only help to understand and stigmatize the EU, but also to predict its future, 
condemned to failure as all such regimes in the past. Secondly, the EU poses an economic threat and the 
Polish accession turned out to be not as profitable as it was allegedly promised before accession. The 
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idea of Poland as a future net-contributor is also invoked in this context. Thirdly, the EU is envisioned as 
an ideological structure that promotes regional and continental identity in order to eradicate the national 
one. More importantly, the EU rejects a centuries-old Christian tradition and God as a founder of the moral 
and social order. They are replaced by secular, liberal, and egoistic orders hostile to the national culture. 
The process of integration in general is represented as guided by the ideological attitudes. Representation 
in terms of a project or effort of all cooperating states is not possible here. The integration grows out of 
ideological thinking aimed at the radical re-socialization and cultural uprooting of member states. Fourthly, 
the threat posed by the EU is bigger and more dangerous than the previous violations of independence 
because it is difficult to grasp. It escapes easy conceptualization, it is a dispersed invisible threat, growing out 
of sources and applying methods of struggle which are difficult to identify. This epistemological argument 
helps to act in the guise of an insightful critique which is supposedly able to uncover the hidden reality. 
The vision of threat is enhanced by the militaristic lexicalization used to depict the relationship between 
Poland and the EU (for example battle, defence, attack, front) Sixth, the EU is envisioned as an institutional 
structure opposed to Europe, understood either in geographical or cultural-religious (Christianity) terms. 
Seventh, an exaggeration plays an active role in linking elements in the chain of equivalences, connecting 
the EU with the worst. In one of the election documents the EU is equated with the destruction of Polish 
agriculture, confiscation of Polish property, sexual deviation, euthanasia, killing of unborn children, cloning 
of the people (Dlaczego Liga Polskich Rodzin jest przeciwna wstąpieniu Polski do Unii Europejskiej? 2006: 
76). Eighth, “the EU” as a category is sometimes metonymically replaced by “Brussels bureaucracy” or just 
“Brussels”. It is also envisioned as a structure which serves the interests of the biggest states, especially 
France and (even more often) Germany. Although the EU is most often referred to as a monistic structure, 
it is also easy to find such definitions which identify internal differentiations, mainly on the basis of power, 
economic strength and size. 
The social and political landscape of this position is informed by the vision of radical and insurmountable 
frontiers. “The other” of this position is being described as hostile, aggressive enemy, whom it is impossible 
to cooperate with. The line of division runs along the position in the structure of power. Discourse takes 
up one of the typical populist opposition between the people (in this case the nation and its state) and 
political elites (Canovan 1999; Mudde 2004). “The other” is characterized by its rejection and hostility 
towards nation state. The internal “other” includes Polish politicians of all groupings regardless of 
nuances of their attitudes towards the EU. Differences between them are minimized and presented, in an 
unmasking tone, as a smokescreen hiding their real “pro-European” face. Internal “others” are constructed 
through intentions or interests attributions. They are guided by ideology or material interests, seeking 
to reap benefits from the integration process. The external “other” is articulated through a number of 
nominations and predications: the EU as centralized structure, the United States of Europe (Janusz Dobrosz 
in a parliamentary debate on government information on Polish foreign policy 2005), politicians of the 
biggest European countries, world governments, the international capital. The characteristic feature of 
these two types of “others” is that they are not separated entities but inextricably connected through 
their hierarchical relation. Their bonds are based on the subordination of internal powers to external one. 
The former are sometimes (explicitly or implicitly) represented as executors of decisions which were made 
elsewhere.
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4.  Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to reconstruct the structure of discursive positions pertaining to the relationship 
between Poland and the EU. Such a problematization of the research topic draws on the assumption 
that Europe is always understood in relation to the nation state and, in turn, the image of the latter is 
explicitly referred to or can be inferred from the vision of the EU. The analysis of the empirical data has 
revealed three discursive positions which organize the production of meaning and govern the strategies 
of representation. The first position represents the EU as a chance for the further modernization of Poland 
and its future position. It was occupied mainly by the Democratic Left Alliance and Civic Platform. The 
second position perceives the EU as the game of interests between sovereign nation states. The task of 
the nation state is to benefit from cooperation within an extra-state structure and to retain maximum 
sovereignty at the same time. Its origins are connected with the Law and Justice party. The third position 
can be identified by “a threat” as a keyword. The EU is rejected as a structure hostile to the nation state, 
its interests, independence, and sovereignty. The League of Polish Families should be mentioned here. 
The Self–Defence and Polish Peasants Party, groupings which are the main source of trouble for political 
scientists, based their discourse on the combination of elements taken from more than one discursive 
position, connecting, for example, nationalistically interpreted national interests with a pro-European 
attitude. The methodology adopted here helped to show how the same topics and words acquire different 
meanings in the context of particular interpretations of other words. Categories such as chance, threat, 
interests, nation, state, sovereignty, “Europe of fatherlands”, and modernization are flowing between 
different positions but their meaning and their discursive significance are completely different. Comparative 
party politics with its focus on party attitudes, rather than analyses of the meaning of “Europe”, overlook 
the fact that there are different entities which are hidden behind the same word. What is more, “Europe” 
may mean different things not only because there are different discursive positions but also because 
parties manipulate the ontological status of the entity by referring to actual or future state of the things. 
This analysis has focused on the general synchronic level, revealing the structure of discourse. It is less 
concerned with the parties which conveyed these structures in their statements. The next important step 
would be to analyze the diachronic dimension in order to show how parties took up those elements in 
their reaction for the immediate events in the current history of Poland – EU relations. It would analyze 
the details of the discursive reactions for the concrete events. A diachronic dimension would also show to 
what extent speaking on Europe can be understood in terms of the diffusion of ideas rather than a simple 
reaction of, first, the pluralization of the political sphere after 1989 and, second, the accession to the EU 
after 2004. The strength of the historical frames and topics mentioned here, suggests that the answer 
may be provided rather by the genealogical analysis of traditions of Polish political thought. Given that 
the diffusion does not express itself through mechanical adoption of the patterns invented elsewhere, 
it is necessary to take both dimensions into account to scrutinize how the international discourse is 
accommodated with the local ideas and frames. 
It is also important to note that the “sleeping giant” already exists on the level of party discourse, in 
a sense that mainstream consensus over the EU so often assumed by political scientists, actually has 
a strong divisive potential articulated through different meanings of the same words. In fact, at least 
since the presidential elections of 2000, analysts of Polish politics were looking for the new dimension 
of political struggle, which could replace allegedly old-fashioned and worn-out divisions between post-
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communists and anti-communists. For many the division over the European Union seems to be a good 
candidate in this respect. The EU accession, the necessity to cede certain prerogatives to the supra-state 
structures and the politics at this level, the European Parliamentary election campaign, have opened 
a new space of competition and provided new topics to struggle over. What is more, the issue is new, 
complex, pertaining to practically all dimensions of nation states and touching upon the most fragile 
aspects of its existence: identity, sovereignty, and prerogatives of the supreme institutions. Nevertheless, 
it is questionable whether in the nearest future it can take over the place occupied by already existing 
divisions. The European issue in Poland constitutes no more than merely one of many lines of political 
struggle and it is only one additional dimension of party identities. As this study has shown, this dimension 
is inextricably connected with the elements, themes and divisions already existing at the domestic level. 
The European elements were rather incorporated into the already existing structure of tensions than 
radically restructured the realm of political struggles. Finally, one has to notice the lasting potential of 
the distinguished discursive positions pertaining to the European issue. Given the structural properties of 
discourse as such, it is not only the domestic issues but structure of these positions as well which might 
affect in the future the processes of acquisition of the new content.
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